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Francis March, Appellant, respectfully submits the following brief pursuant
to I.A.R. 35(i).
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Introduction
This is an appeal from the imposition of a life sentence with twenty-seven
years fixed after a guilty plea to first-degree felony murder.
B. Proceedings Below
Francis March was charged by Information with the pre-meditated FirstDegree Murder of Mark Irwin. R 31. She was also charged with not reporting his
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death and with destruction of evidence. R 32. An amended information alleging a
felony-murder alternative theory was filed. R 67. A second amended information
alleged only the felony-murder theory. It alleged that Francis “did, along with
another, unlawfully kill and murder Mark Irwin, a human being, during the
commission or attempted commission of the crime(s) of Robbery and/or Burglary by
administering a dose of quetiapine to incapacitate Mark Irwin and strangling Mark
Irwin with a rope or bedsheet, from which he died.” R 105-6.
Prior to the change of plea hearing Francis filed the following written factual
basis where she admitted participating in a felony where a co-participant killed Mr.
Irwin, but denied killing or intending to kill him.
The Defendant Francis Marie March, on August 5, 2016, in the County of
Ada, State of Idaho, Without having the intent to kill, did along with another
willfully and unlawfully commit the crime of robbery and/or burglary that
resulted in the unlawful killing of a human being. The robbery and/or
burglary began by Francis Marie March and another administering a dose of
[quetiapine] to Mark Irwin (decedent). Francis Marie March administered
[quetiapine] with the intent to render the decedent unconscious to accomplish
a theft. Additionally, Francis Marie March whose intent was to accomplish a
theft did with another attempt to strike decedent with an implement in order
to render him unconscious. As part of a common scheme to steal Francis
Marie March, finally without having an intent to kill did wrap an end of a
rope around a door handle. Another increased the pressure of the rope around
the decedent’s neck. Francis Marie March believes the death occurred while
another acted to strangle the decedent. At no time did Francis Marie March
act with an intent to kill, but only with an intent to render the decedent
unconscious to accomplish a theft.
R 103-104. Francis pleaded guilty to Count I of the Second Amended Information. R
108-112.
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At the change of plea hearing, Francis continued to insist that she did not
intend Mr. Irwin’s death, nor did she kill him.
A. . . . in the factual basis that Mr. DeFranco and I came up with, except for the
last line of increasing pressure of ropes, that's correct, and that all fits with felony
murder. So, yes, we discussed it, it's just -- it was difficult, but yes.
Q. You understand.
A. I do understand that being convicted or being guilty of felony murder means you
are guilty of murder, but that is different than my personal understanding of when
you personally kill someone.
Q. Felony murdered [sic] is classified as first degree murder, it is a form of first
degree murder. The elements of felony murder are as set forth in the second
amended information in Count I in this case, and those are the things that you're
admitting the truth to by pleading guilty. Do you understand that?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. That's all you're admitting to.
A. Right.
T pg. 43, ln. 2-20. See also pg. 51, ln. 17 – pg. 54, ln. 12 (setting forth the factual
basis).
The court accepted the guilty plea and ordered a psychological evaluation as
well as a Presentence Investigation Report. T pg. 55, ln 4-8. Michael Johnston
Ph.D, did the court-order evaluation and Craig Beaver, Ph.D, reviewed that report
and completed an independent evaluation.
At sentencing the court stated:
In considering the factors the Court must, in looking at the issue of protection
of the community, it is clear to me that Ms. March, because of her total
disregard for the value of life and property of others, combined with her
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mental illness identified in the reports -- primarily personality disorders,
frankly – a lengthy sentence, at a minimum, is necessary to protect the
community. A lengthy sentence is also necessary for general deterrence,
given the nature of this crime and the nature of the conduct after the murder
in this case.
T pg. 118, ln. 7-16. It sentenced Francis to life imprisonment with twenty-seven
years fixed. R 167. A timely Notice of Appeal was filed. R 172. An Amended Notice
of Appeal was filed the next day. R 175.
II. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did the court abuse its discretion in sentencing a forty-seven year old, with
no prior felony convictions, to life imprisonment with a fixed term of twenty-seven
years on a non-intentional felony-murder conviction?
III. ARGUMENT
A. Standard of Review.
Appellate review of a sentence is done under the abuse of discretion
standard. State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276, 1 P.3d 299, 304 (Ct. App.
2000). Where a sentence is not illegal, the appellant has the burden to show that it
is unreasonable. State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 825 P.2d 482, 490 (1992). A
sentence may represent an abuse of discretion when it is shown to be unreasonable
upon the facts of the case. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324
(1982). A sentence of confinement is unreasonable if it appears at the time of
sentencing that confinement is longer than necessary “to accomplish the primary
objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
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deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given case.” State v. Toohill,
103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). This Court conducts an
independent review of the record, having regard for the nature of the offense, the
character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. State v. Reinke,
103 Idaho 771, 772, 653 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 1982). The question before the
Court, however, is whether the district court abused its discretion in imposing the
sentence. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008).
B. Why Relief Should be Granted.
Francis March is a forty-seven-year-old mother of three. PSI. pg. 1, 54. She
had no prior felony record, save a possession of a controlled substance charge which
was dismissed upon her successful completion of drug court, and there are no
violent offenses in her history of misdemeanors. PSI, pg. 37.
The PSI summarized Dr. Johnston’s report:
Dr. Michael D. Johnston conducted this evaluation on 01/16/2018 and
diagnosed the defendant with Personality disorder with antisocial,
borderline, narcissistic and paranoid traits; Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity
Disorder, combined presentation, severe; Bipolar II Disorder, moderate;
Panic Disorder, severe; Substance Use Disorder (alcohol, methamphetamine,
crack-cocaine, and cocaine), severe.
PSI, pg. 62.
Both Dr. Johnston and Dr. Beaver found Francis suffers from Bipolar type 2
disorder. PSI, pg. 11; PSI, pg. 7380. The National Institute of Mental Health states
that Bipolar II is “defined by a pattern of depressive episodes and hypomanic
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episodes, but not the full-blown manic episodes," described as type I. 1 Dr. Beaver
wrote that "with regard to psychopharmacological treatment of her bipolar type 2
disorder and her depression, this is readily available within the correctional system.
She would be an excellent candidate for a mood stabilizing medication, as well as
medication for her depression." PSI, pg. 7380.
Dr. Johnston found Francis suffers from ADHD. PSI, pg. 21. This disorder,
of course, can be treated by prescription medication.
Both doctors diagnosed Francis with controlled substance and alcohol abuse
disorders. PSI, pg. 211, 7378. Dr. Beaver noted there were some resources
available within the women's correctional system, such as AA, NA, or other similar
support programs, "as well as being restricted from access from substance abuse
while incarcerated." PSI, pg. 7380.
While Francis did not meet the full criteria for a diagnosis of post-traumatic
stress disorder, it was clear that she had been subjected to traumatic experiences
in her life, e.g., "the sexual abuse by the maternal grandfather from around age 6 to
12" and "physical and emotion abuse by her parents and first husband." PSI, pg.
7379. Dr. Johnston agreed with Dr. Beaver in this regard. PSI, pg. 211.

Type I manic episodes last at least seven days or are so severe as to require
immediate hospitalization. www.nimh.nih.gov/heal th/topics/bipolardisorder/index. shtml
1
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1. The sentence is longer than needed to protect society.

A twenty-seven year fixed sentence means that Francis will not be parole
eligible until October 21, 2043. 2 She will be seventy-four years old. As the average
white, non-Hispanic, female in the United States lives to be eighty-one, 3 Francis's
life expectancy will only be seven years past her parole eligibility date. By that
time, she will be unable to work, will have no savings or pension, and will have no
health insurance other than Medicare. The sentence here is very near a fixed life
sentence. A fixed life sentence requires a high degree of certainty that the
perpetrator could never be safely released back into society or that the nature of the
offense requires that the individual spend the rest of his life behind bars. State v.

Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875, 253 P.3d 310, 312 (2011). Because the sentence here
is nearly indistinguishable from a fixed life sentence, this Court should scrutinize
the sentence more closely than the usual case.
Dr. Johnston wrote that, "Based on the possible categories oflow, moderate,
or high, the examinee presented as a high risk to re-offend within the next five to
ten years." PSI, pg. 213. However, Dr. Beaver noted that five to ten years is not the
relevant timeframe, as "it is anticipated she will have an extended period of
incarceration." More pertinent is the fact "there is a significant drop in risk once
individuals, including sex offenders, enter into their fifth and sixth decade of life,
which she will be soon approaching." PSI, pg. 7380.
2

www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/prisons/offender search/detail/126615

3

www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr66/nvsr66 04.pdf, pg. 3.
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In regard to future risk with regard to criminal acts (i.e. drug possession,
traffic violations, etc.), I agree with Dr. Johnston that in the short run, she is
at high risk for reoffending in that regard given her lifestyle and resources.
However, again, she is likely to have an extended period of incarceration. As
she enters in the fifth and sixth decade of her life, the risk of her engaging in
those behaviors is substantially reduced.
PSI, pg. 7381.
Dr. Beaver continued:
Finally, in regard to violent risk assessment, this is more complex. While I
agree with Dr. Johnston that she is at high risk for illegal activity if she were
allowed back out in the community, she does not have a prior history before
this event of being violent. She does have a prior criminal history, but none of
those involved violence. None of her family, former spouse, and oldest
daughter report any aggressive, violent behavior, even when utilizing
substances. In this regard, Felony Murder for which she has plead, is an
outlier. There are no indications that she is somebody you would necessarily
have anticipated, even knowing her history and difficulties, that would have
engaged in violent behavior. Therefore, since this is an outlier and not part of
an established pattern, I would consider her, even in the short run, at being
low risk for violent behavior. Certainly, if she is incarcerated through the
fifth decade of her life, this risk is reduced even further. Therefore, I would

consider her at relatively low risk for violence if back out in the community in
the next 10-15 years or longer.
PSI, pg. 7381 (emphasis added).
As a ten-year fixed sentence will leave Francis fifty-seven years old at parole
eligibility and a fifteen-year sentence would have her in prison until age sixty-two,
either sentence is sufficiently long to allow her to age out of her criminality.
Consequently, the twenty-seven-year sentence is longer than needed to protect
society and is unreasonable.
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2. The sentence is longer than needed to achieve the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.
First, as to specific deterrence, a twenty-seven year sentence is excessive. As
noted above, this is Francis’s first felony conviction, first violence offense, and arises
from circumstances unlikely to occur again. Moreover, she will soon “age out” of
criminal behavior.
As to general deterrence, it is the fact that some punishment is imposed, not the
severity of the punishment, which deters others from committing offenses. Social scientists
have concluded that people obey the law more because they fear the disapproval of their
social group and because they generally see themselves as moral beings who want to do
the right thing as they perceive it, than because they see someone else being punished. In
fact, the threat of legal punishment has been determined to have a negligible effect on
behavior. See, e.g., Tom Tyler, Ph.D., "Why People Obey the Law" (New Haven and Yale
Press, 1990) at p. 65. A more recent review of the literature from the Sentencing Project
notes that “[c]riminological research over several decades and in various nations generally
concludes that enhancing the certainty of punishment produces a stronger deterrent effect
than increasing the severity of punishment.” Wright, Valerie, “Deterrence in Criminal
Justice: Evaluating Certainty vs. Severity of Punishment,” (2010) pg. 7.4
Thus imposing twenty-seven years of confinement instead of ten or fifteen will not
create any additional general deterrent effect. Further, it is not necessary for specific
deterrence.
www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Deterrence-in-CriminalJustice.pdf (last visited May 17, 2018).
4

9 • BRIEF UPON SENTENCING APPEAL

Second, a twenty-seven year fixed term for a non-intentional felony-murder
conviction is more than is needed to provide adequate retribution.
Finally, regarding Francis’s rehabilitation, age will rehabilitate her. In
addition, her bipolar disorder and ADHD are both treatable through medication.
She will be able to complete drug and alcohol treatment well before even the
mandatory ten-year sentence could be served.
IV. CONCLUSION
The sentence should be vacated and modified to a fixed term of ten years.
Respectfully submitted this 28th day of November, 2018.
/s/ Dennis Benjamin
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Appellant
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Idaho State Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
ecf@ag.idaho.gov
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